Behavior, communication, and assumptions about other people's behavior in a commons dilemma situation.

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Database: PsycARTICLES

[ Journal Article ]

Dawes, Robyn M.; McTavish, Jeanne; Shaklee, Harriet

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol 35(1), Jan 1977, 1-11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.35.1.1

Two experiments investigated effects of communication on behavior in an 8-person commons dilemma of group vs individual gain. A total of 593 persons recruited through newspaper ads served as either participants or observers. Ss made a single choice involving a substantial amount of money (possible outcomes ranging from nothing to $10.50). In Exp I, 4 communication conditions (no communication, irrelevant communication, relevant communication, and relevant communication plus roll call) were crossed with the possibility of losing money. Ss chose self-serving (defecting) or cooperating responses and predicted responses of other group members. Defection was significantly higher in the no-communication and irrelevant-communication conditions than in relevant-communication and relevant-communication plus roll call conditions. Loss had no effect on decisions. Defectors expected much more defection than did cooperators. Exp II replicated irrelevant communication and cooperation effects and compared predictions of participants with those of observers. Variance of participants' predictions was significantly greater than that of observers, indicating that participants' decisions were affecting their expectations about others' behavior. (16 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)