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Citation

Database: PsycARTICLES
[ Journal Article ]
Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree.
Kahneman, Daniel; Klein, Gary
American Psychologist, Vol 64(6), Sep 2009, 515-526. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0016755

Abstract

  1. This article reports on an effort to explore the differences between two approaches to intuition and expertise that are often viewed as conflicting: heuristics and biases (HB) and naturalistic decision making (NDM). Starting from the obvious fact that professional intuition is sometimes marvelous and sometimes flawed, the authors attempt to map the boundary conditions that separate true intuitive skill from overconfident and biased impressions. They conclude that evaluating the likely quality of an intuitive judgment requires an assessment of the predictability of the environment in which the judgment is made and of the individual’s opportunity to learn the regularities of that environment. Subjective experience is not a reliable indicator of judgment accuracy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)

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