Stout, G. F. (1896). The process of attention. In G. F. Stout, Library of philosophy. Analytic psychology, Vol. 1, pp. 180-223). New York, NY, US: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/12910-009
We have already endeavoured to give a general definition of attention. The distinction between attention and inattention is according to, this definition coincident with the distinction between noetic and anoetic experience. We attend in so far as our psychical activity directly produces, or maintains and develops, such contents of consciousness as have a more or less determinate objective reference. The object referred to may be of any kind whatever, e.g., a material thing, the quality of a present sensation, a bygone emotion, a system of philosophy, or the nature of the soul. If and so far as any content of consciousness is a perception, idea, conception, apprehension or awareness of somewhat, the activity in and through which this content exists is attentive activity. This account of the matter is in obvious agreement with the common-sense view according to which attention is the self-direction of the mind to an object. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)