Brown, T. (1827). Of consciousness. In T. Brown & L. Hedge (Ed.), A treatise on the philosophy of the human mind, being the lectures of the late Thomas Brown (pp. 66-71). Cambridge, MA, US: Hilliard and Brown.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/11701-007
In the systems of philosophy, which have been most generally prevalent, especially in this part of the Island, consciousness has always been classed as one of the intellectual powers of the mind, differing from its other powers, as these mutually differ from each other. To the whole series of states of the mind, then, whatever the individual momentary successive states may be, give the name of our consciousness,--using that term, not to express any new state additional to the whole series, but merely to denote the wide variety of our feelings; in the same manner, as I use any other generic word, for expressing briefly the individual varieties comprehended under it. Consciousness, then, in its simplest acceptation, when it is understood as regarding the present only, is no distinct power of the mind, or name of a distinct class of feelings, but is only a general term for all our feelings, of whatever species these may be, sensations, thoughts, desires;--in short, all those states or affections of mind, in which the phenomena of mind consist; and when it expresses more than this, it is only the remembrance of some former state of the mind, and a feeling of the relation of the past and the present as states of one sentient substance. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)