Fichte, J. G. (1889). Book first: Deduction of the conception of rights (A. E. Kroeger, Trans.). In J. G. Fichte & A. E. Kroeger (Trans.), The English and foreign philosophical library. The science of rights (pp. 31-83). London, Great Britain: Trübner & Co.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/12992-001
A finite, rational being cannot posit itself without ascribing to itself a free causality. If a rational being is to posit itself as such, it must ascribe to itself an activity which shall have its last ground in itself. Its activity in contemplating the world can not be posited by the rational being as such an activity, which has its last ground in itself. But the rational being can opposite such an activity as we are in search of, to the world, as that which limits this activity, and in order to opposite it can generate it. Moreover, if such an activity is the sole condition of the possibility of self-consciousness, and if self-consciousness must be ascribed to a rational being, as indeed that which constitutes it a rational being, then it must opposite and generate such an activity. Through the positing of its power to have free causality, the rational being posits and determines a sensuous world outside of itself. The finite rational being cannot ascribe to itself a free causality in the sensuous world, without ascribing the same to others, and, hence, without like wise assuming other finite rational beings outside itself. The finite rational being can not assume other finite rational beings outside of itself, without positing itself as occupying a determined relation toward them, which is called the Legal Relation. The subject must distinguish itself through opposition from the rational being, which it has assumed outside of itself. In this distinction through opposition the conception of the subject as a free being, and the conception of the outside rational being, as also a free being, are mutually determined and conditioned through the subject. I can suppose that a certain rational being will recognize me as a rational being only in so far as I treat it myself as such. But I must assume that all rational beings outside of me will in all possible cases recognize me as a rational being. I must recognize the free being as such in all cases, that is, must restrict my freedom through the conception of the possibility of his freedom. The deduced relation between rational beings, namely, that each individual must restrict his freedom through the conception of the possibility of the freedom of the other--is called the Relation of Legality, Legal Relation; and the formula given to it is called the Fundamental Principle of the Science of Rights. This relation has been deduced from the conception of the individual. The conception of Law (of Rights) is itself condition of self-consciousness; and hence, this conception has been properly deduced a priori, that is, from the pure form of Reason, from the Ego. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)