Hodgson, S. H. (1898). Feelings in spatial extension. In S. H. Hodgson, The metaphysic of experience, in four books, Vol. 1. Book 1, General analysis of experience (pp. 207-241). New York, NY, US: Longmans, Green and Co.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/12392-004
There are some feelings which, without ceasing to be parts of the continuous time-stream, have also a space-element, occupy some portion of space, and are parts of an experience which is spatially as well as durationally extended. The feelings which immediately and inseparably have this space-element, and so are spatially extended, are of two kinds, the sensations of sight and of touch. Why, it may be asked, may not the sensations of sight and touch also owe their spatial extension to association? The answer has already been given implicitly. If sensations of sight and touch owed their spatial extension to association, it could only be to association, not with other sensations, but with spatial extension itself. But sensations of sight and touch prior to the supposed association, that is, apart from spatial extension, are mere abstractions. The ultimate fact of perception, in the case of these two senses, is a complex fact; that is, every such perception has an element of feeling and an element of spatial extension inseparably bound up together, the former occupying the latter, just as all feelings, and these among the rest, have a time-element, in virtue of which they occupy time. To this reasoning it is sometimes replied by Empiricists, that Metaphysicians miss the whole point of their argument, which is, that the power of association, which is admitted to account satisfactorily for a great number of our conceptions, is a power great enough to have effected the fusion of spatial extension with feelings of sight and touch, and that so completely, that we are now positively unable to perceive, or even think of them, except as combined. Association, they say, will really account for the very fact of inseparability in consciousness. I will try to show the futility of the empiricist's contention. Time is no dimension or direction of space; it is not, as some have suggested, its fourth dimension. Neither is it, as some might hastily imagine, the third dimension of space. The question, then, is, how the third dimension of space comes to coalesce with that visually perceived extension, in which not more than two dimensions, as they are afterwards called are perceived; how we come to the full perception of space in three dimensions, and to regard it as a single homogeneous unity. In doing this we must, I think, have recourse to association, the association of ideas in our minds, resting on and conditioned by the combined and simultaneous exercise of some other sense or senses together with that of sight. The different meaning of vision in psychology and metaphysics is discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)