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http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/13695-032
The question I have set out to discuss is: Shall the doctrine of mind and matter advocated in the preceding chapters be set down as repudiating final causes? as reducing the human mind to a shadow whose desires and purposes are without significance? as turning nature into brute mechanism—a thing to be feared, but in no wise to be loved? In treating this question I shall set forth the doctrine of final causes in typical modern form; and I shall then try to make clear that, when certain metaphysical misconceptions are set aside, the doctrine of final causes may be frankly accepted, as embodying truth, by one who approves the reasonings contained in this volume. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)